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Platforms, the First Amendment and Online Speech:
Regulating the Filters
Sofia Grafanaki*
Abstract
In recent years, online platforms have given rise to multiple
discussions about what their role is, what their role should be,
and whether they should be regulated. The complex nature of
these private entities makes it very challenging to place them in
a single descriptive category with existing rules. In today’s
information environment, social media platforms have become a
platform press by providing hosting as well as navigation and
delivery of public expression, much of which is done through
machine learning algorithms. This article argues that there is a
subset of algorithms that social media platforms use to filter
public expression, which can be regulated without constitutional
objections. A distinction is drawn between algorithms that
curate speech for hosting purposes and those that curate for
navigation purposes, and it is argued that content navigation
algorithms, because of their function, deserve separate
constitutional treatment. By analyzing the platforms’ functions
independently from one another, this paper constructs a doctrinal
and normative framework that can be used to navigate some of
the complexity.
The First Amendment makes it problematic to interfere with
how platforms decide what to host because algorithms that
implement content moderation policies perform functions
analogous to an editorial role when deciding whether content
should be censored or allowed on the platform. Content
navigation algorithms, on the other hand, do not face the same
doctrinal challenges; they operate outside of the public discourse
Sofia Grafanaki researches the personal and social implications of new
technologies. She focuses on the desirability and possibility of their democratic
supervision. The author has worked extensively with startups in the Big Data
space, holds two L.L.M. degrees from NYU School of Law, an M.B.A. from
Columbia Business School, and a law degree from Oxford University. She is
admitted to practice law in New York, London, and Athens.
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as mere information conduits and are thus not subject to core
First Amendment doctrine. Their function is to facilitate the flow
of information to an audience, which in turn participates in
public discourse; if they have any constitutional status, it is
derived from the value they provide to their audience as a delivery
mechanism of information.
This article asserts that we should regulate content
navigation algorithms to an extent. They undermine the notion
of autonomous choice in the selection and consumption of content,
and their role in today’s information environment is not aligned
with a functioning marketplace of ideas and the prerequisites for
citizens in a democratic society to perform their civic duties. The
paper concludes that any regulation directed to content
navigation algorithms should be subject to a lower standard of
scrutiny, similar to the standard for commercial speech.
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Introduction
In February 2018, Facebook and Instagram were singled out
by the Justice Department, more than any other technological
tool, as critical to Russian efforts to influence the 2016

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/3

2

ARTICLE 3_GRAFANAKI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

REGULATING THE FILTERS

3/28/2019 1:46 PM

113

Presidential Election.1 Facebook handed over to Congress more
than 3,000 ads that were purchased by the Russian troll farm
known as the Internet Research Agency,2 which, according to the
company, reached eleven million of its users.3 Research however
indicates, that the organic reach of the Russian-controlled
accounts was dramatically bigger; Facebook users may have
been exposed to such content hundreds of millions, or perhaps
billions, of times.4 Shortly after the election, a news analysis
found that during the last few months of the US Presidential
campaign, the top-performing fake news stories on Facebook
generated more engagement than the top stories from major
news outlets.5 On April 10th and 11th of 2018, Facebook CEO
1. Sheera Frenkel & Katie Benner, To Stir Discord in 2016, Russians
Turned Most Often to Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/02/17/technology/indictment-russian-tech-facebook.html.
2. See generally Adrian Chen, The Agency, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 2, 2015,
at 57; Neil MacFarquhar, Inside the Russian Troll Factory: Zombies and a
Breakneck Pace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2018, at A11; Mike Isaac & Scott Shane,
Facebook to Deliver 3,000 Russia-Linked Ads to Congress on Monday, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/technology
/facebook-russia-ads.html; see also Dylan Byers, Facebook Handed RussiaLinked Ads Over to Mueller Under Search Warrant, CNN BUS. (Sept. 17, 2017,
11:29
AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/15/media/facebook-muellerads/index.html?sr=fbCNN091517facebook-mueller-ads0907PMStoryLink
&fbclid=IwAR3C0D5OQteU9ogfkny_loixjJNDCrRhToQc2DRwYCrcEMcBxlT
Ho2rm4p4; Benjamin Siegel, Facebook Turns Over Thousands of RussiaLinked Ads to Congress, ABC NEWS (Oct 2, 2017, 5:04 PM), https://abcnews
.go.com/Politics/facebook-turns-thousands-russia-linked-adscongress/story?id=50226525.
3. Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data:
Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the U.S. S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 115th Cong. 5 (2018) (testimony of Mark
Zuckerberg, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Facebook),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/04-1018%20Zuckerberg%20Testimony.pdf.
4. Craig Timberg, Russian Propaganda May Have Been Shared
Hundreds of Millions of Times, New Research Says, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/05/rus
sianpropaganda-may-have-been-shared-hundreds-of-millions-of-times-newresearch-says/?utm_term=.ffb82f4fe621; see generally Itemized Posts and
Historical Engagement - 6 Now-Closed FB Page, TABLEAU PUB., https://public
.tableau.com/profile/d1gi#!/vizhome/FB4/TotalReachbyPag (last updated Oct.
5, 2017).
5. Craig Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News
Stories Outperformed Real News on Facebook, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016,
5:15 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-newsoutperformed-real-news-on-facebook?utm_term=.yxER8laNQ#.avAbrgen7.
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Mark Zuckerberg testified before the Senate and two
Congressional Committees after a scandal broke out that
political consulting firm, Cambridge Analytica, had improperly
obtained personal information on eighty-seven million Facebook
users.6 The CEOs of Google and Twitter were also called to
testify.7 The Facebook hearings were supposed to be about
Facebook’s data privacy practices, but questions came up on a
wide range of topics, such as the existence of political bias within
the company, Facebook’s role in the opioid crisis, whether
Facebook is responsible for the content on its platform the same
way publishers are, and whether Facebook is a monopoly.8
Cambridge Analytica subsequently announced that it was
shutting down.9
These incidents represent only the latest wave of issues
involving online platforms. In recent years, the platforms’ many
functions have given rise to disagreements both in academic
literature and pop culture about what their role is and what it
should and should not be. Are platforms media companies or
technology companies?
Are they broadcasters or mere
intermediaries?
Are they editors with First Amendment
protection, or do they behave like state actors? Do they operate
like public utilities? Are they monopolies?10 The list of questions
continues, but underlying the growing body of literature is a
6. See Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The
Scandal and the Fallout So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html.
7. Alfred Ng, Senate Summons Facebook, Google, Twitter CEOs over Data
Privacy, CNET (Mar. 26, 2018, 1:23 PM), https://www.cnet.com/ news/senatecalls-google-facebook-twitter-ceos-in-for-data-privacy/.
8. See Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, WASH. POST (Apr.
10,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04
/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senatehearing/?utm_term=.e87c9e091a48; Transcript of Zuckerberg’s Appearance
Before House Committee, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/11/transcript-of-zuckerbergsappearance-before-house-committee/?utm_term=.cec873708c75.
9. Rebecca Ballhaus & Jenny Gross, Cambridge Analytica Closing
Operations Following Facebook Data Controversy, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2018,
7:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cambridge-analytica-closing-opera
tions-following-facebook-data-controversy-1525284140.
10. For an analysis of the different analogies used, see generally Heather
Whitney, Search Engines, Social Media, and the Editorial Analogy, KNIGHT
FIRST AMENDMENT INST. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org
/content/search-engines-social-media-and-editorial-analogy.
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common set of concerns: should we regulate the way these
platforms handle public expression, and, if so, can we do it in a
way that is aligned with our constitutional values?
This paper answers both concerns in the affirmative,
arguing that there is a subset of algorithms social media
platforms use to filter public expression, which can be regulated
without constitutional barriers. These are the content
navigation algorithms,11 which, because of their function,
deserve separate constitutional treatment. Unlike algorithms
that decide what content to censor or allow on the platform,
which perform a somewhat editorial role and, as such, receive
constitutional protection, the regulation of content navigation
algorithms is not preempted by the First Amendment. This
categorization is elaborated on below, but to make the point less
abstract, an application is offered: while we cannot address a
phenomenon like fake news by outlawing its existence or
requiring platforms to censor it, what we can do is address the
way fake news gets amplified by regulating the algorithms that
perform content navigation functions. Fake news is only one of
the issues that such regulation can address; it serves as a timely
example because it is an issue that, perhaps better than any
other, has highlighted the pathologies of the current digital
information ecosystem.12
A first step to unpacking the issues is to clarify what we
mean when we refer to online platforms.
Social media
companies were the first to use the term platform in describing
their services, but the term now extends to companies focused
on services beyond expressive content, such as retail (Amazon),
transportation (Uber), and real estate and hospitality
(AirBnB).13 For the purposes of this paper, the analysis is
limited to the original use of the term, i.e. to social media
platforms that handle predominantly expressive content.
Examples include: Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube.

11. See infra Part II(B) for definition and discussion of content navigation
algorithms.
12. See generally David M. J. Lazer et al., The Science of Fake News, 359
SCI. 1094 (2018), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1094.
13. Tarleton Gillespie, The Platform Metaphor, Revisited, CULTURE
DIGITALLY (Aug. 24, 2017), http://culturedigitally.org/2017/08/platformmetaphor/.
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Retail and other platforms operate under different economics
and should be analyzed separately. Google, although it has
somewhat similar economics to social media platforms, is also
distinguishable in the way it curates public expression.
Social media platforms are private entities that play two
distinct roles in the systems of information flow: 1) they host
public expression online, i.e. they offer storage, and 2) they
provide “navigation and delivery of the digital content of
others.”14 They operate as online content intermediaries, whose
functions are performed by algorithms that are designed by
humans, with humans sometimes interfering with the results of
the algorithms.
Interestingly, commentators have pointed out that the
choice of the word platform is not accidental, both in the
companies’ self-characterizations and in the public discourse.
Rather, the term reveals the position that such intermediaries
are trying to establish.15 A platform connotes “a ‘raised, level
surface’ designed to facilitate some activity that will
subsequently take place.”16 The term is “anticipatory, but not
causal,” implies an initial neutrality, and suggests a progressive
and egalitarian arrangement that promises to “support those
who stand upon it.”17
As such, the word platform seems to serve social media
companies quite well. Social media companies have to appeal to
different constituencies, namely users, advertisers, content
producers, and policymakers, in a way that eases the tensions
between them and implies equality and fairness.18 Using such
positioning, these private entities have become the primary
curators of the cultural discussion online,19 but have managed to
14. Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of ‘Platforms,’ 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y
347, 348 (2010); see also EMILY BELL & TAYLOR OWEN, TOW CTR. FOR DIG.
JOURNALISM, THE PLATFORM PRESS HOW SILICON VALLEY REENGINEERED
JOURNALISM (2017), http://towcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/The_
Platform_Press_Tow_Report_2017.pdf.
15. Gillespie, id. at 348.
16. Id. at 350.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 348.
19. See Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Social Media
Platforms 2017, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.journalism
.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/ (reporting that,
according to a 2017 survey by the Pew Research Center, 67% of Americans get
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present themselves as the antidote to traditional mass media
associated with the notion of “elitist gatekeeper[s].”20 Part I will
elaborate on these dynamics, but for introductory purposes two
(perhaps self-evident) observations are made. Firstly, the
interests of the different constituencies involved are not aligned
most of the time. Secondly, it is the economic interests of the
platforms themselves as private companies that ultimately drive
their business models.
Curating speech or expressive content can come in flavors,
and there are several problematic issues when it comes to how
these private entities curate speech. To make sense of them, this
Article starts by making an important distinction. There are two
different ways in which these private entities curate speech,
which parallel their separate functions of hosting versus
providing navigation and delivery of public expression.
The first way platforms curate or govern online speech is
through their content moderation policies. The process of
content moderation determines whether specific content items
can be hosted and can continue to be hosted on the platform. It
addresses the question of whether content can exist or survive
on the platform (ex ante and ex post moderation21), regardless of
who actually sees or interacts with it. This process involves
monitoring for illegal, offensive, and inappropriate content, or
content that is simply not consistent with the culture of the
users, and subsequently deciding whether to censor such
content.22 Content moderation policies consist of detailed sets of
rules, which are constantly updated and largely opaque. Their
opaqueness has been long criticized by scholars23 and has
occasionally been the cause of public outcry in instances where

news from social media).
20. Gillespie, supra note 14, at 352.
21. See id. at 1636–38.
22. See Kate Klonick, Comment, The New Governors: The People, Rules,
and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018)
(arguing that “these platforms are best thought of as self-regulating private
entities, governing speech within the coverage of the First Amendment by
reflecting the democratic culture and norms of their users” (footnotes omitted)).
23. See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet
Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.
401 (2017); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries
and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986 (2008).
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content is perceived as unjustly or wrongfully removed.24 While
concerns relating to content censorship decisions are very
legitimate and thoroughly discussed by academics, they are not
the focus of this paper.
The second way in which these platforms govern speech is
by providing navigation through the infinitely growing quantity
of available content. In this case, the curation process is not
about allowing or disallowing content, but rather curation is
about deciding to which specific content items to point the users’
attention. It is this latter type of speech curation that is
addressed in this paper.25 Such curation is addressed both to
users as individuals through personalization algorithms, and to
all platform users as a whole, through algorithms that select
content that is trending or popular. In both of these forms,
content navigation algorithms are, to an increasing degree,
shaping our participation in public life.26 As Tarleton Gillespie
has observed, “[t]ogether, these algorithms not only help us find
information, they also provide a means to know what there is to
know and how to know it, to participate in social and political
discourse, and to familiarize ourselves with the publics in which
we participate.”27
The concerns in this type of speech curation are not about
censorship per se. Algorithmic measures of popularity or what
is trending make an explicit claim of a “calculated public[]” and
become cultural objects of meaning, in which individuals can
look for “a reflection of the public in which they take part.”28
24. See Zoe Kleinman, Fury over Facebook ‘Napalm Girl’ Censorship,
BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37318031.
25. The two categories may seem to overlap sometimes, such as when a
trending algorithm selects content that is considered illegal or inappropriate,
but the questions of why the specific content was allowed to exist on the
platform and why it surfaced as popular or trending are still fundamentally
different questions.
26. Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHS.:
ESSAYS ON COMMC’N, MATERIALITY, & SOC’Y 167, 167 (Tarleton Gillespie et al.
eds., MIT Press 2014).
27. Id.
28. Tarleton Gillespie, #TrendingisTrending: When Algorithms Become
Culture, in ALGORITHMIC CULTURES: ESSAYS ON MEANING, PERFORMANCE & NEW
TECHS. 52, 67, 69 (Robert Seyfert & Jonathan Roberge eds., 2016) (explaining
that “calculated publics. . .imply a body of people who have been measured and
assessed, as an explanation for why particular information has been presented
as relevant to them” and that “trending algorithms make the claim of this
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However, the ways in which this public is measured and shaped
depart significantly from traditional assumptions on the role of
news media in society and the democratizing promise of the
Internet. This raises growing concerns about the failure of
media literacy and lack of data literacy.29 Personalization
further adds to the concerns, as the fracturing of individual
experiences, has been criticized for producing filter bubbles and
echo chambers.30 Users are only directed to content that is in
agreement with their existing viewpoints, which in turn leads to
ideological isolation, polarization in society, and increased
vulnerability to believing in falsehoods—or so the argument
goes.31
The distinction between the two types of speech curation
just described—curating for hosting purposes versus curating
for navigation purposes—matters especially when assessing the
viability of legal regulation, and can help categorize the growing
body of literature. Doctrinal barriers32 make it extremely
challenging to regulate how platform content moderation
policies work, meaning how platforms make decisions about
what content items to host. On the other hand, this paper will
argue, the challenges are not as strong when it comes to how
platforms facilitate content navigation. The assertion is that we
should regulate content navigation algorithms to an extent, that
calculated public more explicit: this is what ‘we’ are reading, this is what my
city or country is tweeting about, this is what America is listening to today.”).
29. See Monica Bulger & Patrick Davison, The Promises, Challenges, and
Futures of Media Literacy DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST. 15–17 (2018),
https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_Media_Literacy_2018.pdf.
30. See generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET
IS HIDING FROM YOU (Penguin Books Ltd. 2011); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC:
DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (Princeton Univ. Press 2017).
31. See Michela Del Vicario et al., The Spreading of Misinformation
Online, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. AM. 554, 558 (2016),
http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/113/3/554.full.pdf (stating “[u]sers tend to
aggregate in communities of interest, which causes reinforcement and fosters
confirmation bias, segregation, and polarization. This comes at the expense of
the quality of the information and leads to proliferation of biased narratives
fomented by unsubstantiated rumors, mistrust, and paranoia”); but see Yochai
Benkler et al., Study: Breitbart-Led Right-Wing Media Ecosystem Altered
Broader Media Agenda, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php
(suggesting that polarization is asymmetric).
32. Namely, the First Amendment combined with Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act.
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we can do so without doctrinal barriers, and that doing so can
address some of the challenges present in the content
moderation context.
The paper proceeds in the following manner: Part I
addresses the question of why regulate at all and explains what
makes online platforms deserving of independent analysis. Part
II addresses doctrinal barriers to regulation and argues that
these do not apply in the content navigation context. Part III
touches on an additional way to regulate the content navigation
architecture and provides a brief supplementary discussion on
the failure of self-regulation. Part IV concludes.
I. Why Regulate?
This part of the paper illustrates what is different in today’s
information ecosystem, why online platforms deserve
independent analysis and why we should regulate at all.
A. Is There Anything Different Here?
Before embarking on the analysis of platforms, it is worth
taking a brief pause and looking at a bigger picture. Back in
1996, at a conference on the Law of Cyberspace, Judge Frank
Easterbrook flatly told the assembled crowd that no one in the
room was going to win a Nobel Prize and that they were all at
risk of multidisciplinary dilettantism.33 For Judge Easterbrook,
the Law of Cyberspace was as useless as the Law of the Horse.34
His reasoning was that “the best way to learn the law applicable
to specialized endeavors is to study the general rules.”35 Cases
on people kicked by horses are better understood through the
law of torts, not by reading 100% of the cases on this very specific
issue.
Similarly, one could argue that, in some ways, there is
nothing special about online platforms. We have the general
rules on issues such as defamation, discrimination, competition,
33. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207 (1996).
34. See id.
35. Id.
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free speech, intermediary liability, and so forth. This will not be
the first time the law has to adapt to a new technology, nor is it
the first time that companies driven by advertising profits select
the headlines. Media companies have been doing this for
years.36 However, there is something very special about
cyberspace and there is value in looking at these platforms
separately. Presented below are two responses advanced by
scholars that illustrate why in the context of cyberspace the
issues deserve independent study.
Writing in 2004, Jack Balkin cautioned that “[i]n studying
the Internet, to ask ‘What is genuinely new here?’ is to ask the
wrong question.”37 For Balkin, focusing on novelty is the wrong
way to think about technological change and public policy.38 We
will always find an analogue in the past, and then conclude that
because there is nothing utterly new, nothing important has
changed.39 Instead, what we should be focusing on is salience.
In Balkin’s view, the right questions to ask are: which elements
of the social world and what features of human activity or the
human condition are emphasized and brought to the foreground
by the new technology?40 More importantly, what are the
consequences of this new emphasis for human freedom?41 In
other words, even if there is nothing utterly novel, and the
change is not a change in kind but simply one of degree, it can
still have important consequences for society.
From a different point of view, Lawrence Lessig saw a
structural change taking place in cyberspace, one that can teach
very important general principles.42 Lessig points out that law
36. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
37. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2
(2004).
38. Id. at 2–3.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. A few years post-Judge Easterbrook’s intervention, Lawrence Lessig,
who could not put the issue behind, wrote a commentary in the Harvard Law
Review, as well as a more complete book, in an effort to illustrate that the Law
of Cyberspace can, in fact, teach some very important general principles. See
generally Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach,
113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (Basic Books 1999).
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is just one of the ways that human behavior can be regulated;
there are three additional modalities of regulation, namely
social norms, markets, and architecture.43 These modalities
regulate together, and any policy’s ultimate effect should be seen
as the sum of the regulatory effects of all four modalities
together. Why does this matter for our purposes? The answer is
that, in the digital environment (i.e. cyberspace), the fourth
modality is quite different than it is in real space.
By architecture, Lessig refers to the physical world—both
“as we find it” and “how it has already been made.”44 He gives
the example of the city of Paris, where large boulevards limit the
ability of revolutionaries to protest;—a constraint on behavior
that has nothing to do with legal regulation. Similarly, Long
Island bridges were built low, blocking public buses from passing
under. The result was that people depending on public transport
could not get to the beaches in Long Island, but the constraint
was one imposed by architecture.
The non-plasticity of real space means there is very little we
can do to change the architecture once it is there, or that doing
so is disproportionately costly.
In cyberspace however,
architecture is a function of code; it is the code that defines the
conditions of access and the limits of functionality, and code is
not static. Programmers can change the code in an instant. The
government can also regulate the code by demanding that
programmers change it; we cannot say the same about
rebuilding bridges. This implies two things for any possible
regulatory scheme: first, changes in the code can change the net
effect of any policy, and second, it is much easier in cyberspace
than it is in real space to direct policies to the architecture.
If we apply Lessig’s framework to online speech, we
conclude that in the digital ecosystem, the conditions of access
to speech and to speakers are both easy and quick to change.
This is because it is code that provides the architecture through
which speech is regulated online. Programmers can change the
access parameters—the code—at their initiative, or because
legal regulation requires them to do so. Any legal intervention

43. The Law of the Horse, supra note 42, at 507; see also CODE AND OTHER
LAWS, supra note 42, at 30–42.
44. The Law of the Horse, supra note 42, at 507.
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can be directed to this architecture, to the content (speech), or
to both.
Let us look at the fake news example in order to
contextualize the prior discussion: a problem like fake news is
very challenging for regulators. For starters, many would argue
that fake news has always existed; it is a very old problem and
there is nothing novel about it that requires the attention of the
regulators.45 Further, any attempt to regulate fake news can be
perceived as worse than the problem itself.46 Let us imagine a
regulation making fake news illegal and requiring platforms to
remove it; in fact, the Malaysian government recently passed
such a law.47 In the U.S., it is extremely unlikely that it could
pass First Amendment scrutiny—and for good reason. From a
policy perspective, we do not want the government deciding
what counts as fake, nor do we want to punish people for being
wrong on the Internet, as both can have a chilling effect on
speech in general. What regulators can do, however, is address
the way fake news is spread and amplified through the
platforms’ architecture. This type of regulation is addressed to
the content navigation algorithms and it is not subject to the
same doctrinal and normative limitations. It does not target the
existence of fake news, but rather the ways in which an old
problem has become more salient due to the unique features of
the digital ecosystem that control speech online.48
45. See Eugene Volokh, Fake News and the Law, from 1798 to Now,
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/09/fake-news-and-the-law-from1798-to-now/?utm_term=.660884b067ba.
46. Anthony L. Fisher, Fake News Is Bad. Attempts to Ban It Are Worse,
VOX (July 5, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/7/5/15906382/fakenews-free-speech-facebook-google.
47. Hannah Beech, As Malaysia Moves to Ban ‘Fake News,’ Worries About
Who Decides the Truth, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2018, at A5; Sandeep Gopalan,
Free Speech Cannot Be Sacrificed to Strike Fake News, THE HILL (Apr. 6, 2018,
11:00
AM),
http://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/381871-free-speechcannot-be-sacrificed-to-strike-fake-news; Yantoultra Ngui, Malaysia Passes
‘Fake News’ Law that Critics Call an Assault on Speech, WALL ST. J. (April 3,
2018, 8:07 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/malaysia-passes-fake-news-lawthat-critics-call-an-assault-on-speech-1522757225.
48. Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: Towards a Better Theory
for Platform Governance, 127 YALE L.J. F. 337 (2017), http://www.yalelaw
journal.org/forum/real-talk-about-fake-news.
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The fake news example will be used throughout the paper
as a thread to demonstrate the asserted arguments. The next
section explores the conditions of speech in the digital
ecosystem, highlighting why there is a need for regulation under
these new conditions.
B. The New Environment
Up until quite recently, the main barrier to speech entering
the marketplace of ideas was thought of as the (in)ability to
publish and access the distribution channels. Content was
scarce, and the focus of regulatory schemes was to ensure that it
was not suppressed. For instance, the fairness doctrine, which
required broadcasters to present both sides of issues of public
importance, was valid at a time when broadcast spectrum was
scarce. The Court saw the doctrine as promoting First
Amendment values49 such as an unfettered marketplace of
ideas.
Today, we live in a very different information environment.
Technology has made it extremely cheap, quick, and easy, for
just about anyone to create content and make it available online.
Platforms, acting as online intermediaries, provide speakers
with access to a large audience, having little incentive
themselves to monitor the content that is distributed through
them.50 Information has become abundant; in fact, we are
drowning in it, and what is now becoming scarce is that which
information consumes, i.e. the attention of the listeners.51 The
term attention economy52 has almost made its way into pop
49. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
50. See infra Part II(A) (discussing Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act).
51. See Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an InformationRich World, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37,
40–41 (Martin Greenberger ed., Johns Hopkins Press 1971) (stating “in an
information-rich world, the wealth of information means a dearth of something
else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information consumes. What information
consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence
a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate
that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that
might consume it”).
52. See TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET
INSIDE OUR HEADS 6 (Knopf 2016).
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culture, with more and more news articles referring to the
concept.53
In this information-rich environment, platforms have taken
on the role of the curators, using their algorithms to distribute
and deliver content—speech—to their audience.
We the
listeners need someone—the algorithms—to curate for us and
tell us where to look; it is simply impossible to go through
everything that is out there on our own. The platforms on the
other hand, want to keep our attention because they want to
keep us on the platform. The more time users spend on the
platform, the more appealing that platform becomes to
advertisers, who are then willing to spend more money to
capture the attention of these users. For the most part, the
revenue of the platforms comes from advertising, so they need to
establish a reputation of keeping their audience happy and
engaged; this makes users return to the platform and
advertisers willing to pay money for those users.
The tricky part is that the platforms’ goal is not necessarily
welfare enhancing. They just need to keep users on the
platform. In fact, sometimes lower quality or easier-to-consumecontent can serve this goal better.54 The exact criteria each
platform chooses are mostly opaque, but what is becoming clear
is that these private companies have developed intricate

53. Charles M. Blow, Opinion, Trump’s Attention Economy, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/opinion/trump-attentioneconomy.html; Mathew Ingram, The Attention Economy and the Implosion of
Traditional Media, FORTUNE (Aug. 12, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/12/
attention-economy/; Andrew Keen, The ‘Attention Economy’ Created by Silicon
Valley
Is
Bankrupting
Us,
TECHCRUNCH
(July
30,
2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/30/the-attention-economy-created-by-siliconvalley-is-bankrupting-us/; Robert Safian, How to Stand Out in the Attention
Economy, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com
/40473876/how-to-stand-out-in-the-attention-economy.
54. See PARISER, supra note 30, at 68 (describing the theory of “least
objectionable programming” as it originates from researching TV viewers’
behavior in the 1970s, where it was noticed that with the increasing number
of available channels, people quit channel surfing far more quickly than one
might suspect. During most of those thirty-six hours a week (that Americans
watch TV), the theory suggests, they are not looking for a program in
particular, but rather they are just looking to be “unobjectionably
entertained.”); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 65 (describing information
cocoons and group polarization).
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systems for moderating and curating speech.55 As highlighted
in the introduction, there is a conceptual distinction between
speech curation for hosting purposes versus speech curation for
content navigation purposes. The former involves deciding
whether content is allowed to exist on the platform, while the
latter involves deciding which items to draw the users’ attention
to.
When it comes to the latter, one could argue that majority
tastes and popularity of content have always played a role in
content selection and placement.56 Traditional media has
always used these factors in decision-making, especially when
choosing headlines, but audience feedback was never as accurate
and instantaneous. Big Data technologies now allow for precise
tracking and analysis at the moment of content consumption.
They also allow for instantaneous adjustment of the content
selection based on the feedback. Traditional editors never had
that kind of power.57 Algorithmic navigation represents a new
kind of knowledge logic, to be contrasted with the editorial
logic.58 That it not to say that one is better than the other in
55. Klonick, supra note 22, at 1660.
56. See Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google
Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67
DUKE L.J. 981, 1021, 1023 (2018) (noting that, with the rise of the
contemporary American newspaper, “[n]ewspapers began to compete in the
‘commodity’ of ‘news, i.e. information respecting recent events in which the
public takes an interest, or in which an interest can be excited’” and “expanded
their circulation by reshaping the commodity of news to meet the interests of
the masses. Newspapermen justified their expansion by claiming to supply
‘what the public wanted—witness their growing sales’”) (citations omitted).
57. A/B testing and its application to news headlines is an illustration of
how extreme this editing can get. See A/B Testing, OPTIMIZELY,
https://www.optimizely.com/ab-testing (illustrating how extreme this editing
can get through A/B testing and its application to news headlines); see also
C.W. ANDERSON ET AL., THE NEWS MEDIA: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 65
(Oxford Univ. Press 2016) (stating “[b]oth new and old news media also are
using digital technology to closely monitor the size and news habits of their
audiences, including audiences for individual stories, images, and features on
their websites. Some news organizations are using these audience metrics to
evaluate the productivity of their journalists and the popularity of their stories,
even basing compensation on that data. Some also are using digital traffic data
to decide what news to cover, rather than relying only on journalists’ news
judgment”).
58. See Gillespie, supra note 26, at 192 (noting that “the editorial logic
depends on the subjective choices of experts, who are themselves made and
authorized through institutional processes of training and certification, or
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deciding what information to draw the public’s attention to; the
point is that they are different.
With significant traffic on news sites coming from social
media platforms, editorial decisions of traditional news outlets
may now include calculations addressing the ways in which
specific platforms filter content. Reporters feel additional
pressure to write click-bait articles that “pander to readers’
worst impulses,” as the stories that actually gain traction online
are the “[t]oo-good-to-check” stories rather than the ones that
are comprehensively reported.59 In fact, studies show that 59%
of the links shared on Twitter have not been read at all by the
people who share them.60 The majority of users simply sees and
shares headlines without ever looking at the content of the
articles below them. These headlines then get amplified,
because in the eyes of content navigation algorithms, the
number of shares an article gets is more indicative of what is
important and popular than the percentage of users that
actually read the article.61
In the context of this new algorithmic knowledge logic,
traditional news outlets face an uncertain future. They still
have to bear the costs of producing content that adheres to
journalistic standards, but as their audience has moved to the
social web, they have lost control of the distribution channels
and the advertising revenues that follow these channels. The
platforms are now the biggest distributors of news and, at the
same time, they control the public discourse. If we had to draw
an (imperfect) analogy, the platforms are both the newsstand
validated by the public through the mechanisms of the market. The
algorithmic logic, by contrast, depends on the proceduralized choices of a
machine, designed by human operators to automate some proxy of human
judgment or unearth patterns across collected social traces.”)
59. Timothy B. Lee, Mark Zuckerberg Is in Denial About How Facebook
Is Harming Our Politics, VOX (Nov. 10, 2016, 10:25 PM), http://www.vox.com
/new-money/2016/11/6/13509854/facebook-politics-news-bad.
60. MAKSYM GABIELKOV ET AL., SOCIAL CLICKS: WHAT AND WHO GETS READ
ON TWITTER? (2016), https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01281190/document; see also
Caitlin Dewey, 6 in 10 of You Will Share This Link Without Reading It, a New,
Depressing Study Says, WASH. POST (June 16, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/06/16/six-in-10-of-you-willshare-this-link-without-reading-it-according-to-a-new-and-depressingstudy/?utm_term=.0c9e20635aeb.
61. Id.
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and the town square, and the content available on the
newsstand is constantly updated based on the town square
discussion. Put differently, what used to be just “ephemeral
words” in a traditional town square, is now “indexed data”
accessible to a remarkable degree of granularity.62 Additionally,
every person sees a different newsstand because content
navigation algorithms personalize our news feeds. So the town
square is looking less like an agora and more like a Tower of
Babel.
To put these concerns into perspective, in 2017 two-thirds
(67%) of U.S. adults were found to get news on social media (the
leader of which is Facebook).63
The increase in news
consumption on social media is especially notable for different
demographics than previously: in 2017, 55% of Americans ages
fifty or older reported getting news on social media sites versus
45% who reported so in 2016.64 As audiences move to the mobile
and social web, news organizations follow. For instance, CNN,
outside its core digital outlets CNN Desktop, CNN Go, CNN
mobile web, and CNN apps, uses five different video platforms,
twelve different social and messaging platforms, and eleven
emerging and off-platforms.65
C. The Dangers
Let us now revisit the fake news example; the phenomenon
has attracted global concern. A first-of-its-kind new study by
MIT scientists based on Twitter data found that falsehoods
“diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly
than the truth in all categories of information, and the effects
were more pronounced for false political news.”66 A group of
62. Syed, supra note 48, at 345.
63. See Shearer & Gottfried, supra note 19, at 2.
64. Id.
65. BELL & OWEN, supra note 14, at 27 fig.2.
66. Soroush Vosoughi et al., The Spread of True and False News Online,
359 SCI. 1146 (2018), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1146
(finding that false news was more novel than true news, which suggests that
people were more likely to share novel information); see also Robinson Meyer,
The Grim Conclusions of the Largest-Ever Study of Fake News, ATLANTIC (Mar.
8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/ largeststudy-ever-fake-news-mit-twitter/555104/.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/3

18

ARTICLE 3_GRAFANAKI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

REGULATING THE FILTERS

3/28/2019 1:46 PM

129

renowned social scientists are calling for interdisciplinary
research to “reduce the spread of fake news and to address the
underlying pathologies it has revealed.”67 The reason we are
collectively alarmed by the phenomenon is not because it is
novel, but because long-standing safeguards against
misinformation have eroded.68 What was previously sitting in
the fringes has now inundated public discourse.69 The agony is
not over the existence of fake news, but rather over the fact that
it can now “spread[] so quickly and persuade[] so effectively.”70
These pathologies of the digital information system are all a
function of its architecture. At the center of this architecture are
the filtering algorithms that provide content navigation.
In a non-platform world, fake news would get quashed at
some point. This is not because anyone would censor it; every
citizen of a democracy has an equal right to participate in the
public discourse, regardless of whether what he or she has to say
is untrue or wrong. Fake news would be quashed in the sense of
being irrelevant because in a functioning marketplace of ideas,
dialogue would eventually lead to a prevailing truth. From a
Meiklejohnian perspective, dialogue would ensure that citizens
vote in a fully informed and intelligent way, at least in theory.71
However, in today’s platform-dominated world, dialogue often
takes the form of a continuous reinforcement of existing beliefs
within polarized silos of personalization. Now that is a big claim,
but the explanation which follows will unpack it.72
Filter bubbles and echo chambers were briefly mentioned in
the introduction, but it is worth revisiting the concepts in light
of all this background.73 In a world of abundant content and
67. Lazer et al., supra note 12, at 4.
68. Id.
69. See generally Syed, supra note 48.
70. Id. at 337.
71. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2367 (2000) (explaining the
Meiklejohnian approach as one that understands the First Amendment “to
protect the communicative processes necessary to disseminate the information
and ideas required for citizens to vote in a fully informed and intelligent way”
and views democracy as a process of “the voting of wise decisions.” (footnote
omitted)).
72. See also infra notes 149–178 and accompanying text.
73. See Sofia Grafanaki, Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big Data, 27
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 803, 825 (2017) (discussing

19

ARTICLE 3_GRAFANAKI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

130

PACE LAW REVIEW

3/28/2019 1:46 PM

Vol. 39.1

attention scarcity, platforms have to figure out how to best direct
users to content. Their economic incentives dictate a need to
keep users on the platform as long as possible. To accomplish
this, they try to serve their users with content that is relevant
to them and market this effort as serving the interests of their
users. Relevance is measured through complex and opaque
calculations involving data on the individual users and users like
them. Clicks and shares indicate engagement and take priority
over the quality of information.74
Research has repeatedly illustrated that when confronted
with diverse information choices, people tend to choose what
feels comfortable and confirms their existing opinion and
biases.75 Individuals are also more likely to believe narratives
they have heard before and information that comes from
familiar sources, such as friends sharing a link.76 When
consuming information, they also settle for the least
objectionable option77 instead of seeking out the best choice, as
the effort alone leads to cognitive overload.78 Putting everything
together, we end up in an environment where users are only
directed to content that is familiar to them and in agreement
with their existing viewpoints—a filter bubble.79 On top of that,
algorithmic self-reinforcing loops).
74. See Matt McGee, EdgeRank Is Dead: Facebook’s News Feed Algorithm
Now Has Close to 100K Weight Factors, MARKETING LAND (Aug. 16, 2013, 9:00
AM),
https://marketingland.com/edgerank-is-dead-facebooks-news-feedalgorithm-now-has-close-to-100k-weight-factors-55908; see also Facebook
NewsFeed Algorithm History, WALLAROO MEDIA https://wallaroomedia.com
/facebook-newsfeed-algorithm-change-history/ (last updated Nov. 20, 2018).
75. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at ch. 4; see also Farhad Manjoo, Our
Grip on the Truth, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
11/03/technology/how-the-internet-is-loosening-our-grip-on-thetruth.html?_r=0.
76. See Syed, supra note 48, at 350 n.45 (referencing the “illusory truth
effect” where “familiarity increases the ease with which statements are
processed (i.e., processing fluency), which in turn is used heuristically to infer
accuracy”).
77. PARISER, supra note 30.
78. See Margarita Tartakovsky, Overcoming Information Overload,
PSYCHCENTRAL,
https://psychcentral.com/blog/overcoming-information-overload (last updated
Jul. 8, 2018) (describing cognitive overload as a phenomenon where our brains
get overwhelmed by too much information and too many choices, and
effectively freeze, leading to indecisiveness, bad decisions, and stress).
79. See generally PARISER, supra note 30 (entering the term filter bubble
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they end up in like-minded communities that transcend previous
geographical barriers.80 When like-minded groups engage in
deliberation, they do so in the confines of their eco-chambers.
The result is a strengthening of the original position and a move
towards a more extreme point,81 amplified by the fact that
platforms are designed for fast and frictionless sharing.82 This
kind of deliberation is very different than the one that promotes
a democratic culture. There is no exchange of ideas in the
marketplace that eventually leads to the truth, or any dialogue
in a Meiklejohnian town meeting where decision-making is
collective process.83 On the contrary, mutual understanding
between groups becomes harder, leading to group polarization.84
This is why the Tower of Babel metaphor was previously
used. Facebook’s new mission statement stresses an effort to
“give people the power to build community. . . strengthen our
social fabric and bring the world closer together.”85 So far
however, these communities that aspire to be the new town
squares seem to be doing the opposite; they resemble a world
where everyone speaks a different language and they provide
fertile ground for falsehoods to spread.
The version of “addictive and toxic misinformation” the
world just experienced with the recent fake news epidemic may
be just the beginning.86 Technological tools that can be used to
manipulate perception and falsify reality are evolving at a fast
pace. The so-called deepfakes, i.e. video content that has been
manipulated using artificial intelligence, may make the current
era of fake news seem antiquated.87 Skeptics warn of a future
to the modern lexicon).
80. Syed, supra note 48, at 347.
81. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at ch. 3 (discussing polarization).
82. Syed, supra note 48, at 350.
83. See Post, supra note 71, at 2367.
84. See Del Vicario et al., supra note 31.
85. Josh Constine, Facebook Changes Mission Statement to ‘Bring the
World Closer Together,’ TECHCRUNCH (June 22, 2017), https://techcrunch.com
/2017/06/22/bring-the-world-closer-together/ (internal quotations omitted).
86. Charlie Warzel, He Predicted the 2016 Fake News Crisis. Now He’s
Worried About an Information Apocalypse, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 11, 2018,
8:45 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/charliewarzel/the-terrifying-future-offake-news?utm_term=.ubzAJl7dY#.plGNq5EMk.
87. Franklin Foer, The Era of Fake Video Begins, ATLANTIC (May 15,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/05/realitys-
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where our eyes routinely deceive us and anyone could make it
appear as if anything has happened, regardless of whether it
did.88 When technology gets there, its existence alone can start
impugning content that is real. If anything can be faked, then
we reach a point where believing falsehoods and not believing
truths are one and the same.89 Imagine for example being able
to make it appear as if a world leader made a statement, which
they did not in fact make. When only few individuals have the
time or skill to sort truth from fabrication, people give up and
stop attempting to figure out what is true and what is fake. The
result is a type of reality apathy that usually only appears in
parts of the world where information is poor and assumed to be
incorrect.90
Hopefully this scenario is just a dystopian
nightmare, but one thing we can learn from the recent fake news
crisis is that the future comes faster than ever before.
What is true today is the following: our current information
environment, as produced by social media content navigating
algorithms, has changed the conditions of speech and is not
aligned with the prerequisites for citizens in a democratic society
to perform their civic duties. Today’s information environment
undermines the notion of individual autonomy in the selection
and consumption of content91 and threatens the viability of a
functioning marketplace of ideas.
First Amendment jurisprudence has been largely shaped by
a different information era, namely a time where the audience
had plenty of time to hear the speakers and the main threat to
the marketplace of ideas was from government censorship of
speakers.92 Today’s information environment has very different
dynamics than the environment the First Amendment can

end/556877/?utm_source=atlfb.
88. Id.
89. Aviv Ovadya, What’s Worse Than Fake News? The Distortion of
Reality Itself, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/22/digital-reality/?utm_term=.b0eaea1c7f81.
90. Warzel, supra note 86.
91. See Grafanaki, supra note 73; see also Sofia Grafanaki, Drowning in
Big Data: Abundance of Choice, Scarcity of Attention and the Personalization
Trap, A Case for Regulation, 24 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26–36 (2017).
92. Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?,
KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST. 19 (Sept. 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/
content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete.
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protect, yet the doctrinal focus on protecting the speaker
remains, which makes it hard to find effective solutions to
problems like trolling and fake news.93 We may all agree that
fake news is undesirable, but we do not want the government
determining what counts as fake. That is exactly what the First
Amendment is supposed to safeguard us from; any regulation
trying to address such an issue would be both a content-based
and viewpoint-based regulation subject to the strict scrutiny
standard, which is very hard to satisfy.
Paradoxically, however, the same doctrine that is meant to
safeguard a functioning marketplace of ideas is almost making
it harder to do that in today’s environment. This is because, as
several scholars have recently pointed out, today’s tactics for
suppressing speech are very different than the ones the First
Amendment was envisioned to address.94 More speech and cheap
speech are the new ways of speech control, used to flood out and
drown other speakers, thus undermining them indirectly.95
Troll armies and bots are often used in this process as well.96
Scholars go as far as to question whether the First
Amendment is, in fact, obsolete in such an environment97 and
argue that the First Amendment can itself be the barrier to
protecting its underlying values.98 This is because today’s
speakers face threats, not just from the government, but also
from the content curation systems they are filtered through. Yet
93. See generally Alice Marwick & Rebecca Lewis, Media Manipulation
and Disinformation Online, DATA & SOC’Y (May 15, 2017),
https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisin
formationOnline.pdf (describing the dynamics of media manipulation and
disinformation online).
94. ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY
OF NETWORKED PROTEST 226 (Yale Univ. Press 2017).
95. See Wu, supra note 92, at 3; see generally Richard L. Hasen, Cheap
Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 200 (2017).
96. Individuals have also used more speech as a tool for reputation
management purposes, for instance creating multiple content entries about
themselves that link to each other in order to push down Google Search results
that they are trying to erase.
See generally REPUTATION.COM,
https://reputation.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).
97. See generally Wu, supra note 92.
98. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data,
Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1149, 1153–54 (2018).
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the platforms designing these algorithmic architectures are not
subject to the First Amendment as private entities, but rather
use the First Amendment as a shield against attempts to
regulate their code. One could again say that we have heard this
all before,99 but we have also seen the Court uphold regulations
as constitutional when legally created markets had harmful
consequences for free speech.100 In those cases, the autonomy of
the speakers was seen as secondary to the commitment to
democratic self-government.101
It is for these reasons that the introduction of regulation
targeting the underlying architecture is desirable. Within this
architecture, if regulation is addressed to the content navigation
algorithms as opposed to content moderation policies, it can be
aligned with constitutional values. The next part of this Article
starts by setting out the normative and doctrinal barriers that
make it hard to regulate content moderation algorithms or
impose liability for content that survives through them. It then
proceeds to show that these barriers do not apply in the context
of content navigation.

99. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 276–
77 (1992) (stating “[t]he idea that threats to speech come from government is
correct, but as conventionally understood, it is far too simple. Sometimes
threats come from what seems to be the private sphere, but those threats are
fundamentally a product of legal entitlements that enable some private actors
but not others to speak and to be heard. When this is so, these legal
entitlements pose a large risk to a system of free expression, one not readily
visible to current law.”).
100. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating
“[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee. . . . It is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial here.”) (citations omitted).
101. See generally Sunstein, supra note 99, at 276 (stating “[t]his vision
of the First Amendment does not stress the autonomy of broadcasters with
current ownership rights. Instead it emphasizes the need to promote
democratic self-government by ensuring that people are presented with a
broad diversity of views about public issues.”).
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II. Doctrinal Analysis
There is an ongoing effort in the academic literature to find
an analogy that places platforms in a category with existing
rules and boundaries, so that we can approach them
appropriately from a regulatory perspective.102 Candidates for
this analogy include editors, newspapers, broadcasters, cable
companies, public utilities, monopolies, state actors, and public
forums. However, analogies are always imperfect, and there is
no universal agreement on which of the analogies best suits
platforms. Some scholars point out the ways in which the
platforms’ role is explicitly editorial, thus deserving the highest
First Amendment protection,103 while others point out how the
editorial analogy fails and these entities are best thought of as
cable providers or public utilities.104
Platforms perform multiple functions and take on different
roles to do so; if we place platforms in a single category—one
role, one function—we oversimplify their complex nature. Only
by analyzing these roles and functions separately and
independently from one another, we can come up with a
regulatory framework that can make sense, both doctrinally and
normatively. Legal frameworks that apply to some of these
functions do not apply to other functions. In some cases, the
platforms’ algorithms perform (something like) an editorial
function resembling a newspaper editor’s judgment about what
to publish and what not to publish.105 Those types of algorithms
102. See Whitney, supra note 10, at 30.
103. See generally Eric Goldman, Of Course the First Amendment Protects
Google and Facebook (and It’s Not a Close Question), KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT
INST. (Feb. 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/course-first-amendmentprotects-google-and-facebook-and-its-not-close-question.
104. See generally Danah Boyd, Facebook Is a Utility; Utilities Get
Regulated, DANAH BOYD: APOPHENIA (May 15, 2010), http://www.zephoria.org
/thoughts/archives/2010/05/15/facebook-is-a-utility-utilities-getregulated.html; K. Sabeel Rahman, Monopoly Men, BOS. REV. (Oct. 11, 2017),
http://bostonreview.net/science-nature/k-sabeel-rahman-monopoly-men; Cale
Guthrie Weissman, Maybe It’s Time to Treat Facebook Like a Public Utility,
FAST COMPANY (May 1, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40414024/
maybe-its-time-to-treat-facebook-like-a-public-utility.
105. Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 438–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(finding the same for search engines); see also e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v.
Google, Inc., Case No. 2:14–cv–646–FtM–PAM–CM, 2017 WL 2210029, at *4
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017).
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cannot and should not be regulated. In other cases, their
algorithms perform functions that are not editorial; the First
Amendment should not preclude us from regulating those to an
extent. However, if we try to place platforms in strictly defined
categories, we will be solving one issue and creating another.
This is why the distinction between content navigation
algorithms and algorithms that implement the platforms’
content moderation policies is so important. The algorithms that
implement content moderation policies can be viewed as being
the closest to the editorial analogy, arguably deserving First
Amendment protection.106 On the other hand, the content
navigation algorithms can be viewed as non-speech for First
Amendment purposes. Further, even if we were to view content
navigating algorithms as some type of protected speech, it is
argues that this would be non-political speech and, therefore,
less problematic to regulate.
Before diving into the doctrinal analysis however, a
clarification is in order: while it may seem counterintuitive, the
idea that computer code is a type of speech has received
considerable support.107 But what do we mean when we say that
an algorithm is protected speech for First Amendment purposes?
Whose speech is that? As Tim Wu has observed: “computers
make trillions of invisible decisions each day; the possibility that
each decision could be protected speech should give us pause.”108
Machine speech and the rights of robots are now topics that have
entered the public debate,109 but in the context of this paper,
what is examined is whether the algorithms embody the
expression of their designers in a way that deserves
constitutional protection. A book embodies the expression of its
106. To be clear, I am not advocating for First Amendment protection in
the case of content moderation; I am simply refraining from arguing that the
First Amendment does not apply.
107. See generally Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First
Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
883 (2012); see also Goldman, supra note 103.
108. Tim Wu, Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/opinion/free-speech-for-computers.html.
109. Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (2013); see
generally James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868 (2014);
Toni M. Massaro, Helen Norton & Margot E. Kaminski, Siri-ously 2.0: What
Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV.
2481 (2017).
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author and, as such, it is protected speech; can we say the same
of an algorithm?
As is the case with most hard questions, the answer is: it
depends; sometimes yes and sometimes no. As Jack Balkin
points out, the deeper issue is “whether companies will be able
to shield themselves from regulation by claiming that their uses
of AI agents, robots, and algorithms are First Amendment
protected activities.”110 Ultimately, what we are trying to figure
out is “which business practices are shielded—and should be
shielded—from government regulation.”111
The next two sections address the two types of algorithms
that platforms use to curate content separately—moderation vs
navigation—and elaborate on the reasoning for treating them
differently.112
The section that follows makes a further
argument limited to personalization algorithms, which is that
personalization algorithms may not even deserve the limited
protections available for non-political protected speech, as they
are better categorized as professional or commercial
communications that fall outside the First Amendment
protection altogether.113
A. Content Moderation Policies and Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act
Content-moderating practices that monitor for unlawful or
other undesirable content are viewed as falling under the realm
of Section 230,114 giving platforms the freedom to moderate
content without facing risks of liability. There is a big debate
around Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
(“CDA”), its effect on online speech, and its desirability; however,
in the context of this paper, it suffices to explain its origins and
perceived purpose. The main idea is that online intermediaries
are not considered publishers or speakers of information
provided by “another information content provider.”115 In other
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Balkin, supra note 98, at 1159.
Id. at 1160.
See infra Parts II(A), (B).
See infra Part II(C).
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
Id.
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words, they are not liable for user-generated content. The
reasoning is that if the intermediaries could be found liable for
defamatory content posted by a user, they would have to take an
active role in policing their users’ content and would naturally
err on the side of censorship. That was seen as a danger to
freedom of speech online, and Section 230 prevented that from
happening. Because of the ways publisher and intermediary are
defined, Section 230 goes even further, so as to protect the good
Samaritans that actually try to take some precautions against
defamatory content.
Regardless of whether this is good or bad law, the end result
is that platforms, as online intermediaries, while not obligated
to monitor and police content provided by others using the
platform, are at the same time free to do so under their own
rules. Recent accounts by commentators illustrate just how
closely these moderation systems resemble a “legal system;” they
curate user content “with an eye to American free speech norms,
[and] corporate responsibility.”116 Yet they operate outside of the
boundaries of the law per se. At their core, platforms are driven
by their economic interests, which dictate a “necessity [to]
creat[e] an environment that reflects the expectations of their
users.”117
One could argue that the fact that Section 230 grants
immunity from liability to the good Samaritans is not
tantamount to a First Amendment right of free expression. Just
because platforms are not liable as publishers for the content
they moderate, it does not necessarily follow that their
moderation practices deserve constitutional protection.
However, out of all the different functions that machine-learning
algorithms perform, these content moderation algorithms are
the closest to an editorial function. Recall that content
moderation algorithms determine whether content is allowed to
exist on the platform, as opposed to where it is placed and how
it is promoted, which is the subject of content navigation. The
decision whether to allow or disallow content is based on the
substance and the message of the content, not on clicks or other
metrics. Humans are continuously involved in this process, and

116. Klonick, supra note 22, at 1599, 1664.
117. Id. at 1599, 1602, 1669.
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they sometimes override the algorithms.118 Platforms are
choosing the type of content that reflects the environment they
want to create; interfering with this process can be seen as a
close analogy to compelled speech.119
In fact, two lower courts’ decisions have come to this
conclusion in the context of search engines where Baidu and
Google had delisted websites from their search results. The idea
is that, just as the First Amendment protects newspaper editors
who cannot be compelled to publish a particular content item,
the same concept applies to search engines, which cannot be
compelled to include certain links.120 The decisions of search
engines to list or delist content as part of their index is the
closest equivalent to content moderation policies of social media
platforms; they both deal with the question of whether content
is allowed to exist—on the index or the platform. Both in Zhang
v. Baidu.com, Inc.121 and in e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v.
Google, Inc.,122 the Courts considered Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo to be the governing precedent; a case where the
Supreme Court held that requiring newspapers to provide a
right to reply to political candidates constituted compelled
speech and was unconstitutional.123 In e-ventures, the Court
found that “[a] search engine is akin to a publisher, whose
judgments about what to publish and what not to publish are
absolutely protected by the First Amendment.”124 Google has
also won lawsuits on free expression grounds against claims that
challenged its choice of which advertisements to display.125 In
Langdon v. Google, Inc., the District Court rejected a claim that
Google had a duty to carry specific advertisements, and again
found that Google’s advertising decisions were similar to those

118. See generally id.
119. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 252 (1974).
120. See generally Volokh & Falk, supra note 107.
121. 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
122. Case No. 2:14–cv–646–FtM–PAM–CM, 2017 WL 2210029, at *3–4
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017).
123. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
124. e-ventures, 2017 WL 2210029, at *4 (citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258).
125. See generally Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del.
2007) (displaying the ease with which lower courts have applied the editorial
analogy). I am noting that advertising decisions are of course different than
decisions about listing/delisting content.
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of a newspaper and, as such, could not be regulated.126
Scholars have questioned the logic of these decisions. Frank
Pasquale notably views the courts’ reliance on Tornillo as
misguided and argues that there is a difference between trying
to advertise in one out of hundreds of newspapers versus in the
one dominant search engine.127 For Pasquale, to the extent that
Google is a media entity, it is closer to the entities subject to the
fairness doctrine in Red Lion;128 he sees a need to ensure
“platform neutrality” in order to prevent intermediaries from
distorting the public sphere or private commerce by virtue of
their size and dominant position.129
Social media platforms’ content moderation decisions may
or may not be distinguishable from search engines’ listing,
delisting, and choice-of-advertisement decisions. The functions
are not identical, but, for now, these are the closest judicial takes
on hosting decisions. Lower courts have been quick to apply the
editorial analogy, finding that search engines’ decisions on what
content to list or delist, or which advertisements to carry, are
similar to a publisher’s decisions about what to publish and,
therefore, fully protected by the First Amendment.
While there are arguments that support the opposite
conclusion130 and the platforms repeatedly make a point to
disassociate themselves from the idea that they are acting as
editors or newspapers, ultimately, it may be best from a policy
perspective not to interfere with the way content moderation
systems work. If, for instance, we viewed them as state actors
whose users had First Amendment rights, as adopting a
different analogy would suggest, the result would be that
platforms would be unable to police spam. They could be quickly
overwhelmed by other undesirable content and to avoid “mass
exodus” of their users they would probably redesign their
algorithms in a way that is explicitly more editorial so that they
126. Id. at 630 (citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256).
127. Frank A. Pasquale, Platform Neutrality: Enhancing Freedom of
Expression in Spheres of Private Power, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 487, 502–
03 (2016).
128. Id. at 503; see generally Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
129. Pasquale, supra note 127, at 489.
130. See Whitney, supra note 10, at 8–13 (discussing the internal
weaknesses of the editorial analogy).
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can claim First Amendment protection.131 However, doing so
would take them outside of the realm of Section 230, and, in
order to avoid liability for third party content, they would err on
the side of caution and censorship. Alternatively, if the
government were to dictate specific rules for content moderation
(for example, fake news is illegal and should be banned), then
we have the government in the position of deciding what is fake,
resulting in indirect censorship because of its chilling effect.
So, regardless of which analogy applies best for First
Amendment purposes, it is not suggested that regulators
interfere with the content moderation systems. Even if we could
agree on the analogy in this context today, it may not apply
tomorrow. Going back to Lessig’s point on the plasticity of the
architecture of cyberspace,132 platforms can very easily change
the code and make today’s analogy inapplicable tomorrow.
The next section discusses content navigation algorithms,
and argues that they should be subject to different treatment
and analysis.
B. Content Navigation Algorithms in General
Content navigation algorithms can be described as machinelearning algorithms that continuously adjust themselves based
on new data inputs. These types of algorithms should not qualify
as speech for First Amendment purposes and, even if they do,
they are lower value speech as opposed to political speech. As
such, any government regulation that addresses them should be
assessed under a lower standard of scrutiny.
In terms of judicial precedent, the notion that the First
Amendment protects content navigation code has again been
made in the context of Google’s search algorithm. The search
algorithm is the closest equivalent to platform’s content
navigation algorithms because the question it addresses is not
whether content exists, but rather where it is placed and
whether the user’s attention is directed to it. In Search King,
Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc.,133 the District Court was faced
131. Goldman, supra note 103 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. See supra Part I discussion and accompanying footnotes.
133. No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 27,
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with the issue of “whether a representation of the relative
significance of a web site as it corresponds to a search query is a
form of protected speech.”134 Google argued that PageRanks are
subjective opinions, and the Court further accepted that search
results are analogous to financial ratings. It then relied on the
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Moody’s Investor’s Services, where
Moody’s rating of bonds was found to be “a statement of opinion
relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a
provably false factual connotation” and as such received “full
constitutional protection.”135 Based on the analogy, the Search
King Court concluded that PageRanks are “opinions of the
significance of particular web sites as they correspond to a
search query,” that they “relate to matters of public concern,”
and because there is “no conceivable way to prove that the
relative significance assigned to a given web site is false,”
Google’s PageRanks are entitled to “full constitutional
protection.”136
A notable point in the opinion, however, is the Court’s
emphasis on the subjective nature of the search results as
opposed to the objective nature of the process performed by the
algorithm. The Court used this distinction to place search
results and not search algorithms within the “protected class of
speech.”137 In a passage worth quoting in full, the District Judge
stated:
Here, the process, which involves the application
of the PageRank algorithm, is objective in nature.
In contrast, the result, which is the PageRank - or
the numerical representation of relative
significance of a particular web site - is
fundamentally subjective in nature. This is so
because every algorithm employed by every
search engine is different, and will produce a
2003).
134. Id.
135. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Inv’r’s Servs., 175
F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497
U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Search King, 2003 WL 21464568, at *3–4 (quoting Jefferson County,
175 F.3d at 852) (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id. at *3.
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different
representation
of
the
relative
significance of a particular web site depending on
the various factors, and the weight of the factors,
used to determine whether a web site corresponds
to a search query. In the case at bar, it is the
subjective result, the PageRank, which was
modified, and which forms the basis for Search
King’s tort action.138
Regardless of whether this distinction makes conceptual
sense, it is important in that it clarifies what speech the Search
King Court felt was deserving of First Amendment protection.
It was not the search algorithm, which the Court viewed as an
objective process, but rather the search result, which took
subjective factors into account. Following this logic, Search King
cannot be read as holding that content navigation algorithms
deserve First Amendment protection because the decision was
focused solely on the results. That said, the distinction is not as
clear-cut as the Court portrays it to be. The factors and the
weights of the factors are also, for the most part, products of
algorithmic calculations.
The more we drill down, the
distinction between process and result starts fading, as
machine-learning algorithms constantly update their process
based on results. Search King is also just a district court decision;
so, regardless of the distinction the Court made, we need to take
a closer look at the First Amendment issues that arise in the
case of social media platforms.
As opposed to Google, who has outright argued that
PageRanks are subjective opinions,139 social media platforms
have not yet made an argument that their news feeds or

138. Id. at *3–4.
139. See generally id. Even though Google argues that its PageRanks are
subjective opinions, it is important to note that it does not take the same
position with respect to other algorithmic functions it performs, such as its
auto-complete function for instance. Instead, Google explicitly states that such
auto-complete search predictions are not the answers to a search query, but
rather the terms are predicted by computer algorithms based on searches from
previous users, not by Google itself.); see also David Meyer, Google Loses
Autocomplete Defamation Case in Italy, ZDNET (Apr. 5, 2011, 2:13 PM),
http://www.zdnet.com/article/google-loses-autocomplete-defamation-case-initaly/.
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trending news features represent protected speech; they even go
out of their way to deny any resemblance to an editorial role.
Notably, Greg Marra, the Facebook engineer whose team
designs the code that drives Facebook’s News Feed, has plainly
stated:
We try to explicitly view ourselves as not
editors . . . We don’t want to have editorial
judgment over the content that’s in your feed.
You’ve made your friends, you’ve connected to the
pages that you want to connect to and you’re the
best decider for the things that you care about.140
Presumably, platforms take this stance because being
perceived as editors is a double-edged sword. If they are editors
and their algorithms are speech, then it follows that they are
media companies; but they really do not want to be media
companies. They want to be seen as technology companies who
do not produce any original content, but merely distribute it in
a neutral way, and whose algorithms simply reflect what users
want.141
Regardless of their self-categorization, there is a conceptual
difference between search engine results and social media news
feeds.
When people use Google, they are searching for
something with the expectation of being presented with correct
and relevant answers to their inputted keywords and queries.
They may use Google as opposed to Bing because of Google’s
reputation as a better search engine, and the process resembles
a type of dialogue where a user actively asks a question and
expects Google to come up with the best answer. The user is
essentially asking Google for its viewpoint on a particular query.
This dialogue sometimes continues when the user adjusts search
parameters such as time period. In that sense Google’s
140. Ravi Somaiya, How Facebook Is Changing the Way Its Users
Consume Journalism, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com
/2014/10/27/business/media/how-facebook-is-changing-the-way-its-usersconsume-journalism.html.
141. See Philip M. Napoli, Sanford Sch. of Pub. Policy, & Robyn Caplan,
Data & Soc’y Research Inst., When Media Companies Insist They’re Not Media
Companies and Why It Matters for Communications Policy, (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2750148.
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algorithm can be seen as expressive and somewhat editorial.
Social media companies, on the other hand, are not perceived
that way and do not intend to be perceived that way. They
explicitly refrain from expressing any viewpoint. Users do not
ask Facebook what content Facebook thinks is relevant to them;
they use Facebook because that is where their friends are. They
individually select which friends to connect with and which
pages to follow, and, when users log on to Facebook, they expect
to view content updates from the individuals and pages they
have themselves selected. The focus is not on Facebook’s
selection and arrangement of these updates; in fact, this is
mostly obscured by the company’s statements.142
Interestingly, in its recent decision, Packingham v. North
Carolina, the Supreme Court found social media to be “the
modern public square,” “the most important places (in a spatial
sense) for the exchange of views” and stated that it is a
“fundamental principle of the First Amendment . . . that all
persons have access” to such a forum.143 The context of this case
was very different, as it concerned a law prohibiting registered
sex offenders from social networking platforms, but it is the
analogy the Court drew and the stress on the right of access that
matters for our purposes. The Court’s approach suggests that
the role of these platforms in public discourse is entirely
different from that of traditional editors and, therefore, should
not be treated as such for First Amendment purposes. Requiring
all persons to have access to a forum is exactly what the
government cannot do when editors are involved.144
The editorial speech courts have traditionally protected145
represents an editor’s judgment about which issues are of public
importance and a commitment to journalistic ethics. That is,
political speech and the First Amendment strongly protects it.
In the case of Facebook, even if the actual content selected is
political in nature, the navigation algorithm itself is not. The
nature of machine-learning algorithms is such that they are
142. See Somaiya, supra note 140.
143. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732, 1735, 1737 (2017).
144. See generally Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974).
145. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 120 (1973).
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constantly changing and adjusting to new inputs in ways that
are so complex, that they often go beyond the comprehension of
their designers. It would be very odd, to say the least, to grant
the same protection we give to political speech to algorithmic
processes and outputs that cannot even be explained by their
own designers.
There is no particular viewpoint or message embodied in
these algorithmic processes; the expression they represent is
driven entirely by clicks and engagement metrics. They are
designed to optimize user engagement. The content of the
algorithm is constantly changing, and, in the case of
personalization algorithms, it is not even directed to more than
one person. Functionally, this is more like selling than editing.
Even if the content items that the algorithms filter are political
in nature, the algorithms themselves are not political speech.
So, if navigation algorithms are protected speech at all, we need
to ask what type of protected speech that is.146
Doctrinally, speech which does no more than “propose a
commercial transaction”147 or “link . . . a product to a current
public debate”148 is considered commercial speech and deserves
a lower degree of constitutional protection. The classic example
of commercial speech is advertising, but there have been
instances where advertising has been considered public
discourse and instances where expression that is not an
advertisement has been considered commercial speech.149
Content navigation algorithms are not a clear example of
commercial speech, but they do not need to be in order to justify
lower constitutional protection. The commercial speech doctrine
is relevant for our purposes because it illustrates why and how
the First Amendment protects non-political speech. Instead of
146. See Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV.
867, 871–72 (2015) (arguing that “First Amendment doctrine protects each
distinct kind of speech in a manner appropriate for safeguarding its particular
kind of constitutional value. ‘Speech as such’ does not contain any
constitutional value.” (footnote omitted)).
147. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976).
148. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557, 562 n.5 (1980).
149. See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech,
48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60 (1983)); see generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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focusing on which descriptive category of speech content
navigation algorithms fall under, it is best to focus on the
constitutional value of the expression in question in order to
determine whether they deserve constitutional protection at all
and, if so, to what degree.150
Scholars like Edwin Baker have argued that commercial
speech should not be protected at all.151 This approach reflects
an autonomy theory of free speech, meaning that individual
liberty and personal agency require speakers to be free to choose
the content of their own message without interference. In the
marketplace, however, speech is dictated by profit-maximizing
and efficiency standards and, as such, does not represent an
exercise of freedom.152
From a slightly different perspective, Robert Post views
First Amendment doctrine as having not one single structure,
but rather as being plural.153 He explains that different types
of speech embody different constitutional values and as such,
each type of speech should receive the protection that is
appropriate for the values it embodies.154 Ordinary First
Amendment doctrine, meaning doctrine concerning political
speech, focuses on the speaker. It protects the right of the
speaker to participate in public discourse and the equal right
of every citizen in a democracy to participate in the formation
of public opinion.155 In contrast, commercial speech is
protected for the informational value it provides to the
listeners, and commercial speech doctrine is focused on the free
flow of information.156 Robert Post identifies this value as
“democratic
competence,”
referring to the “cognitive
empowerment of those who participate in public discourse,”
which is achieved when listeners can receive information

150. Post, supra note 149, at 11.
151. C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84
IND. L.J. 981, 997 (2009).
152. Id. at 986.
153. Post, supra note 146, at 871; Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam
Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 181 (2015).
154. Post & Shanor, supra note 153, at 181–82.
155. Id. at 170.
156. Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
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in order to form their own opinions and make decisions based on
them.157
In other words, political speech is speech that is itself part
of public discourse, and speakers receive the strongest protection
when they engage in public discourse. Commercial speech, on
the other hand, is not itself part of public discourse, but rather
it facilitates the free flow of information so that participants in
the public discourse can form their opinions and the content of
their (political speech) in an informed and intelligent way.
Against this theoretical background, let us now revisit
content navigation algorithms. Even if we accept that content
navigation algorithms are speech for First Amendment
purposes, they are certainly not speech that is part of the public
discourse. Their function is to facilitate the flow of information
to listeners. The listeners are the ones that become speakers
participating in public discourse; the algorithms are merely
information conduits. As such, if they deserve any First
Amendment protection against regulation, it is because of the
value they provide to the listeners in delivering information.
They are different than commercial speech because commercial
speech is itself the information that has value for the listeners,
whereas content navigation algorithms are merely the delivery
mechanism of the information. However, they are similar in
that the constitutional focus is on the listeners and the listeners’
interest in receiving information.
As a new category, content navigation algorithms have no
established legal test which can be applied to potential
restrictions on them. The closest applicable test is the test for
assessing the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial
speech. However, courts need not be bound by it, and there is
no reason to use an already complex and unclear standard for a
category it was not designed for. That said, for the purposes of
this paper, it is useful as an exercise to draw on the commercial
speech doctrine, as it can highlight the types of issues that will
arise.
Given that the reasons to grant some level of
constitutional protection to content navigation algorithms are
similar to the reasons why we protect commercial speech
157. Id. at 170 n.35 (citing ROBERT POST, DEMOCRACY EXPERTISE, AND
ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN
STATE 27–60 (Yale Univ. Press 2012)).
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(meaning, the informational value it has for the listeners), any
new test would presumably draw on ideas similar to those
embodied in the test for commercial speech.
The leading case that establishes the test for the
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech is Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York, which lays out a four-prong test.158 First, for the
commercial expression to be eligible for First Amendment
protection, it must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading.159 Second, it must be determined whether the
government interest to be served by the restriction on
commercial speech is substantial.160 Third, we ask whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted;
and fourth, whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.161
Let us now apply the Central Hudson test to the content
navigation algorithms of social media platforms. If we assume
that the algorithms qualify for protection under the first
prong,162 we then have to articulate the government interest
that the regulation would assert and determine if it is a
substantial interest. Enhancing welfare is typically considered
a substantial government interest,163 and the connection
between the circulation of information and welfare is precisely
why the doctrine of commercial speech exists.164 Therefore,
158. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. There is an argument to be made that these algorithms are actually
misleading and, as such, do not even qualify for limited First Amendment
protection available to commercial speech. Selecting fake news items as
trending or as relevant to a user may be very misleading, but ultimately that
depends on what the algorithms are perceived to do. Because this part of the
test can go both ways depending on interpretation, I proceed to examine the
remaining three prongs as well.
163. See Post, supra note 146, at 891.
164. See id. (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 760, 765 (1976) (stating “[s]o long as we preserve a
predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large
measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent
and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable.”).
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regulating content navigation algorithms in a way that promotes
the free flow of information and encourages the existence of a
functioning marketplace of ideas is perfectly constitutional.
Doing so promotes true autonomous choice in the selection and
consumption of content and the ability to make intelligent and
informed decisions. As such, it is aligned with the prerequisites
for a “free enterprise economy”165 and with the requirements for
citizens in a democratic society to be able to perform their civic
duties, and is, therefore, welfare enhancing.
This leaves us with the last two prongs of the Central
Hudson test: whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is more
extensive than necessary to promote that interest.166 The
assessment of the last two prongs must be done against the
precise language of the regulation, and designing it is inevitably
a multi-disciplinary task requiring the collaboration of
platforms, engineers, academics, and regulators. However, to
illustrate the viability and constitutionality of regulation, an
example of the types of requirements that could be imposed on
the content navigation algorithms is offered. We can imagine,
for instance, a requirement that trending topic algorithms
exclude bot activity from measures of what is trending,167 or a
requirement that algorithms treat links that are shared, but
unopened, differently from links that have actually been opened.
We can also imagine a requirement that content that originated
from an ad, even if subsequently shared organically, cannot be
included in popularity measures of news; or a requirement to
exclude from the news feed algorithms information on how users
interact with ads.168 These are merely examples, because any
165. Id. at 891 (citing Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 765).
166. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
167. This is in fact a step that platforms have purported to initiate on
their own: See Colin Crowell, Our Approach to Bots and Misinformation,
TWITTER: BLOG (June 14, 2017), https://blog.twitter.com /official/en_us/topics
/company/2017/Our-Approach-Bots-Misinformation.html; Jen Weedon et al.,
Information Operations and Facebook, FACEBOOK (2017), https://fbnews
roomus.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/facebook-and-information-operationsv1.pdf.
168. See McGee, supra note 74 (noting that while “the News Feed
algorithm is completely separate from the algorithm that decides what ads to
show, when to show ads, and where to show them[,] . . . how a user interacts
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regulatory proposal has to be the product of systematic
interdisciplinary research that evaluates not only the issues, but
also the potential effectiveness of the interventions. What the
preceding analysis simply illustrates is that the First
Amendment does not prohibit such regulatory intervention.
C. The Special Case of Personalization: Protected Speech v.
Commercial Communications
The preceding discussion relates to content navigation
algorithms used by social media platforms in general; it includes
both algorithms that select content that is trending and
personalization algorithms and argues that regulating them can
be consistent with First Amendment doctrine. This Section will
further argue that personalization algorithms specifically may
not even deserve the limited constitutional protections of the
type afforded to non-political speech.
To understand how to draw the boundaries between
different types of speech, it is again illustrative to look at the
commercial speech doctrine. The category of commercial speech
is defined by two boundaries: the first distinguishes it from
public discourse, which is what has been discussed above, and
the second falls on the other side of the spectrum and
distinguishes commercial speech from other types of
communications that do not receive any of the constitutional
protections afforded to commercial speech.169
Doctrinally, core First Amendment protection involves
political speech, meaning speech that is part of the public
discourse. Non-political speech such as commercial speech,
which gets limited protection, involves speech that conveys
information to those participating in public discourse. Left
unprotected are “those forms of commercial communications
that do not serve to underwrite a public communicative
sphere.”170 Robert Post’s work can again shed light to this
distinction. He points out that, for sociologists, this public
communicative sphere consists of a shared “universe of
with Facebook ads can influence what shows in the News Feed”).
169. See Post, supra note 149, at 15–25.
170. Id. at 22.
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discourse” which exposes strangers presumed to be
“independent and rational” to “similar social stimuli.”171 To
illustrate what falls outside of this public communicative sphere,
Post uses the paradigmatic example of fiduciary relationships,
such as the relationship of lawyers with their clients or doctors
with their patients, which even though involve the conveying of
information, can be regulated without involving the First
Amendment commercial speech doctrine. He suggests that
there are implicit assumptions within the doctrine that
distinguish between personal communications which constitute
relationships of dependence and reliance and impersonal
communications addressed to independent and rational
citizens.172
Personalization algorithms may not be the paradigmatic
example of fiduciary relationships of dependence and reliance.
That said, scholars have suggested that certain types of online
service providers take on fiduciary responsibilities in the digital
age. Neil Richards and Jack Balkin have both written on the
concept of information fiduciaries in the digital age, arguing that
online service providers have a unique relationship with endusers that placed users in a position of dependence and
vulnerability.173 These relationships, they claim, are not
identical to the traditional kinds of fiduciaries, such as lawyers
and doctors, that would require the strictest fiduciary
obligations, but the law should recognize new kinds of fiduciary
relations and obligations that correspond to the respective userentity relationship.174
171. Id. (citing JOHN W. BENNETT & MELVIN M. TUMIN, SOCIAL LIFE:
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION: AN INTRODUCTORY GENERAL SOCIOLOGY 140 (Knopf
1948); Carroll D. Clark, The Concept of the Public, 13 SW. SOC. SCI. Q. 311, 313
(1933); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1249, 1276 (1995)).
172. Post, supra note 149, at 24.
173. See NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE ch. 10 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015); Jack M. Balkin,
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183,
1221–22 (2016).
174. Balkin, supra note 173, at 1223 (stating “we should recognize that a
changing society generates new kinds of fiduciary relations and fiduciary
obligations that the law can and should recognize. The scope of the fiduciary
duty, however, is not the same for every entity. It depends on the nature of the
relationship, the reasonableness of trust, and the importance of preventing
self-dealing by the entity and harm to the end-user, client, or beneficiary.”); see
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To be clear, this Article is not suggesting that the special
duties of the information fiduciaries of the digital age extend to
the way personalization algorithms work. Both Balkin and
Richards are mostly focused on privacy and the handling of
personal information when they talk about these new fiduciary
obligations. This Article is however suggesting, that the nature
of the relationship between platforms and individual end-users
implies that communications in the context of this relationship
fall outside of public discourse altogether. In other words, these
communications should not even receive the limited protections
available to non-political speech, such as commercial speech.
In Lowe v. SEC for instance, the Court found that
“personalized communications create special dangers of ‘fraud,
deception, or overreaching’ that ‘are not replicated in
publications that are advertised and sold in an open market,’”
and found that Congress can treat investment advisors as
fiduciaries consistent with the First Amendment.175 Regardless
of whether fiduciary responsibilities should be imposed on
platforms, what is argued is that, on the personalized level, they
perform a function that falls outside the realm of constitutional
speech protections. This is especially so when there are reasons
to doubt the autonomy of the listeners.176

also RICHARDS, supra note 173, at 168 (stating “[j]ust as we recognized in the
past that certain professionals were fiduciaries of our information, so, too, in
the Age of Information should we expand our definition of information
fiduciaries to include bookstores, search engines, ISPs, email providers, cloud
storage services, providers of physical and streamed video, and websites and
social networks when they deal in our intellectual data. The duties of
confidentiality we place on these fiduciaries need not be ironclad. Sometimes
we want to share our views with the world, and intermediaries can help to do
that, too. But that should be our choice, not theirs.”).
175. See Balkin, supra note 173, at 1219 (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S.
181, 210 (1985). Jack Balkin clarifies that the Court did not say that
investment advisors must be treated as fiduciaries, but simply said that the
First Amendment does not preempt Congress from doing so. Id.
176. See Post, supra note 149, at 41 (offering yet another approach for
why these types of fiduciary relationships do not deserve First Amendment
protection, viewing them as failing the first prong of the Central Hudson test
(i.e. the misleading requirement), and suggesting that the requirement should
be redefined “to focus on the specific conditions that might be understood to
render consumers dependent and vulnerable,” rather than focusing on the
content of speech).
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Let us recall the Facebook social contagion experiment,
which caused an outrage in 2012.177 For a week in January 2012,
the feeds of about 700,000 Facebook users were manipulated to
determine how users’ emotional states change depending on the
nature of the posts they see.178 Some users saw content with a
preponderance of happy and positive words, while others saw
content that was considered sadder than average.179 At the end
of the week, these users were more likely to post content that
corresponded to the type they had been exposed to, that is
especially positive or negative words.180
The experiment
concluded that “emotional states can be transferred to others via
emotional contagion, leading people to experience the same
emotions without their awareness,” and that “emotional
contagion occurs without direct interaction between people
(exposure to a friend expressing an emotion is sufficient), and in
the complete absence of nonverbal cues.”181 Despite the public
outrage, what Facebook allowed to happen on its platform was
probably legal. If so, that would be because of a contractual
relationship between Facebook and each user established
through terms of service and privacy policies. It is not because
Facebook has some First Amendment right bestowed upon its
News Feed.
The fact is that the proliferation of content coupled with the
information asymmetries of the attention economy places users
of social media platforms in a position of disadvantage and
relative dependence on the platforms. There is so much content
out there that individuals do not have the time or attention span
to actively select what they engage with, given the plethora of
available choices. Curators are needed more than ever, and
177. See Kate Crawford, The Test We Can—and Should—Run on
Facebook, ATLANTIC (July 2, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology
/archive/2014/07/the-test-we-canand-shouldrun-on-facebook/373819/; see also
Robinson Meyer, Everything We Know About Facebook’s Secret Mood
Manipulation Experiment, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2014), https://www.theatlantic
.com/technology/archive/2014/06/everything-we-know-about-facebooks-secretmood-manipulation-experiment/373648/.
178. See Adam D. I. Kramer et al., Experimental Evidence of MassiveScale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. U.S. AM. 8788, 8788 (2014).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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unlike search engines users that search for something specific,
social media platform users tend to passively consume content
that makes it on their news feeds. The platforms claim that they
are giving users what they want, so why, one would ask, is there
anything problematic here? Haven’t people always chosen to
read the newspaper or watch the TV channel that corresponds
to their political beliefs? It is not suggested that we need
paternalistic guidance on what we should be reading, nor that
the government is a better judge than the platforms of that is.
What is suggested, however, is that personalization is not quite
the same as a man choosing to read his party’s newspaper; it
represents a different knowledge logic.182
In personalized news feeds, user preferences are implied
based on factors that are opaque. At a minimum, they include
actual data the platform has on the individual, presumably with
the individual’s consent.183 But they also include inferences that
platforms make about the users, which may or may not be
accurate. These isolated points of information (actual data and
inferences) are used to construct what has been called our “data
doubles”184 or “shadow bodies,” which emphasize some
characteristics (in the form of data points), and overlook
others.185 What is emphasized, what is excluded, and, most
importantly, why things are emphasized or excluded, is unclear.
182. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
183. Though meaningful consent to data collection is at best debatable.
See Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer
Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 133 (2013) (stating “[f]irst,
users lack information about the types of harms that may arise from data
collection, the prevalence of those harms, and their costs. Second, users lack
detailed and useful information about company practices involving data
collection, storage, and use. Third, users lack information about how any given
instance of data collection fits into the data about them that is already flowing
in the online ecosystem. Without these three types of information, Internet
users cannot make meaningful assessments of the marginal expected disutility
of any given use of an online product or service. Even if they had the necessary
information, bounded capacity for information processing and bounded
rationality would interfere with their ability to assess their expected disutility
and compare it to the expected utility of a given online product or service.”).
184. See Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant
Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J. SOC. 605, 606 (2000).
185. See Gillespie, supra note 26, at 174 (referring to Ellen Balka and
noting that “the slippage between anticipated user [reflected in the shadow
bodies] and the user themselves that they represent can be either politically
problematic, or politically productive”).
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These “sufficient[ly] approximat[e]”186 digital versions of
ourselves are compared with sufficiently approximate digital
versions of others to determine who “people like us” are and to
identify content these “people like us” have engaged with. Some
version of that content is what ultimately makes it on our news
feeds and supposedly represents what we want to see.
A previous article has developed a complete account of why
personalization algorithms undermine individual autonomy and
do not represent users’ true choice in the selection of content.187
What this Article now seeks to add, is that this asymmetrical
relationship—in terms of information and power—between
platforms and their users is exactly what may disqualify them
from even limited protections of First Amendment doctrine. If
this analysis is correct, regulation of personalization algorithms
would not even need to pass the Central Hudson test, or any
other equivalent test which may be developed for the new
category of content navigation algorithms.
The algorithmic knowledge logic of personalized news feeds
refers to and produces a type of public that is different than the
one that is the subject of First Amendment doctrine. Traditional
newspapers perform a function in the public sphere by uniting
strangers via exposure to common texts.188 These strangers
become a public, capable of possessing an opinion and bringing
self-government to life.189 This traditional public, brought to life
by the printed word, “need not be especially rational, . . . [b]ut it
must exist in the imagination of a population.”190 The look-alike
publics that personalization algorithms refer to, however, are
“calculated publics,” that did not exist until the platform’s
determined their members are alike.191 They are discrete sets of
users that are transformed into an audience, and only the
platforms know its precise membership.192 At some level of
abstraction, these are strangers that already have the same
opinions and endorse the same texts: people like us. However,
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/3

Id. at 174.
See Grafanaki, supra note 73; see also Grafanaki, supra note 91.
See Post, supra note 56, at 1018.
See id.
Id. at 1018–19.
Gillespie, supra note 26, at 188–189.
Id. at 189.
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unlike the viewers of Fox News and MSNBC, or the readers of
the same partisan newspapers, these algorithmic publics may
sound intuitive in their description, but are completely opaque
in practice; “these algorithmically generated groups may overlap
with, be an inexact approximation of, or have nothing
whatsoever to do with the publics that the user sought out.”193
III. Beyond Content Navigation
A. Platform Interface Design: Other Ways to Regulate the
Architecture
In the context of platforms, besides code that functions as
content curation (whether done through content moderation
systems or through content navigation algorithms), there are
also other elements of the architecture that affect the conditions
of online speech and can be regulated.
These deserve a separate and complete analysis, but let us
briefly touch upon one such element in this section: platform
interface design.194 This type of code should be the least
problematic to regulate. In the context of First Amendment
doctrine, such regulation would resemble content-neutral timeplace-manner restrictions, which can be perfectly constitutional.
An example will help illustrate: If we look at the way the
Facebook’s News Feed is currently designed, sponsored content
appears on a user’s feed exactly the same way content from
sources the user follows appears, but for the words suggested
post on the top-left in light grey font. Sometimes the prominent
headline is that a user’s friend likes a page or a post, but this
193. See id.
194. See Gillespie, supra note 26, at 177 (contrasting the early concerns
of blending advertisements and organic content with the current concerns that
are multidimensional and noting that “the landscape of the Facebook News
Feed . . . can no longer be described as two distinct territories, social and
commercial; rather, it interweaves the results of algorithmic calculations (what
status updates and other activities of friends should be listed in the feed, what
links will be recommended to this user, which friends are actively on the site
at the moment), structural elements (tools for contributing a status update,
commenting on an information element, links to groups and pages), and
elements placed there based on a sponsorship relationship (banner ads, apps
from third-party sites)”).
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can either be an organic post or a sponsored post. While the
content is labeled, the label itself is almost designed to integrate
into the post in a way that goes unnoticed.195 Platforms are
making money from the sponsored or suggested posts but not
from organic posts, and the more clicks or eyeballs the paid
content gets, the better for their bottom line.
We can imagine a regulation requiring platforms to clearly
separate organic content from sponsored content, not by simply
labeling the post, but by having paid content appear at different
parts of the screen. This would ensure that readers (the public)
are not confusing the origins of content and do not, or cannot,
share paid content the same way they can share other types of
content. The effect of such a regulation could have a major
impact for problems like fake news, without even addressing the
actual content.
B. Market Forces and Platform Self–Regulation
“The radio . . . is a mighty force for breaking . . .
down [those qualities upon which the enterprise
of self-government depends]. . . . And that
catastrophe . . . reveals how hollow may be the
victories of the freedom of speech when our
acceptance of the principle is merely formalistic.
Misguided by that formalism we Americans have
given to the doctrine merely its negative meaning.
We have used it for the protection of private,
possessive interests with which it has no concern.
It is misinterpretations such as this which, in our
use of the radio, the moving picture, the
newspaper and other forms of publication, are

195. See Craig Silverman et al., In Spite of the Crackdown, Fake News
Publishers Are Still Earning Money From Major Ad Networks, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Apr. 4, 2017, 9:05 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman /fake-newsreal-ads?utm_term=.gggB4Wmw5#.tmj8lAZMV; see also Syed, supra note 48,
at 353.
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giving the name ‘freedoms’ to the most flagrant
enslavements of our minds and wills.”196
Alexander Meiklejohn, 1948
“Markets are generally good things, both for
ordinary products and for speech. But when the
legal creation of a market has harmful
consequences for free expression - and it
sometimes does - then we must reevaluate it in
light of free speech principles.”197
Cass Sunstein, 1990
These passages are quoted to illustrate that the idea of a
market failure in the context of markets for information about
public affairs is not novel. This is not an area where we can
expect the market to correct itself; nor can we rely on the
platforms to self-regulate.
The conflicts of interest and
information asymmetries are such that we are faced with a
market failure. What drives markets and produces welfare is
the satisfaction of individual preferences that are exogenous and
preexist market relations.198 This idea of a market, however, is
entirely inconsistent with the social and behavioral shaping
enabled by the platforms’ algorithmic tools.199
The economic interests of the platforms dictate keeping
their users happy in order to stay on the platform; such
incentives are not necessarily aligned with the users’ best
interests when selecting which content to show them. For
example, fake news may be the kind of content that increases
engagement on a platform. As long as users do not protest
against such content and consume it, the economic incentives of
the platforms would dictate to leave it alone. Section 230 allows
196. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 104–05
(Harper & Bros. 1948).
197. Sunstein, supra note 99 at 277.
198. See generally Yochai Benkler & David D. Clark, Introduction, 145
DAEDALUS: J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 5, 5 (2016).
199. See Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, 145
DAEDALUS: J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 18, 23-24 (2016) (noting that, while a
critique of markets based on the “endogeneity of preferences” is not a new
theme, big data has given it new dimensions).
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them to do so without facing liability risks.200 The economic
incentives change only when there is enough public concern
about fake news that can influence user engagement. The only
reason why platforms would self-regulate is to proactively avoid
government regulation. But despite recurring incidents which
have caused public outcry, the platforms’ proactive measures
have proved inadequate every time.201
Even in cases where the platforms “mistreat” users, the
market may temporarily punish platforms to an extent, as for
example happened with the emergence of the #DeleteFacebook
movement after the Cambridge Analytica story broke, but such
reactions are not effective deterrents for future misbehavior.202
In fact, the irony of the #DeleteFacebook movement is that its
message was spread through the use of hashtags, a filtering tool
made available by social media platforms themselves.203
Besides the asymmetries of information and power, scholars
critique the very idea of “consumer choices” in the context of the
communications system.204 Cass Sunstein has emphasized the
distinction between “consumer sovereignty” and “political
sovereignty,” the former being the idea behind free markets and
the latter the idea behind free nations.205 As consumers, free
markets may serve us well; as citizens, however, this is not
always the case. Political sovereignty entails the considered
judgments of the citizens—the aspirations of the public as a

200. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
201. See generally Josh Constine, Facebook and the Endless String of
Worst-Case Scenarios, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 18, 2018), https://techcrunch.com
/2018/03/18/move-fast-and-fake-things/.
202. See generally Jessica Guynn, Delete Facebook? It’s a Lot More
Complicated Than That, USA TODAY (Mar. 28, 2018, 3:59 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/03/28/people-really-deletingtheir-facebook-accounts-its-complicated/464109002/.
203. See generally Sandra González-Bailón, Want to Change Facebook?
Don’t Delete Your Account—Use It for Good, QUARTZ (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://qz.com/1244750/the-delete-facebook-movement-is-ultimately-selfdefeating/.
204. See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 287; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note
30, at 52–57.
205. SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 52–54 (stating “the notion of consumer
sovereignty underlies enthusiasm for the Daily me [and] . . . is the
underpinning of any utopian vision of the unlimited power to filter. . . . The
notion of political sovereignty underlines the democratic alternative.”).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/3

50

ARTICLE 3_GRAFANAKI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

REGULATING THE FILTERS

3/28/2019 1:46 PM

161

whole206—and, unlike consumer sovereignty, which views
individuals as having fixed tastes and preferences there to be
discovered, political sovereignty understands individuals and
communities as being shaped by the political process. In the
context of platforms, the two concepts can get especially blurred.
The same platform appeals to both our role as consumers,
expecting to choose exactly as we wish, and to our role as citizens
of a democratic society, requiring information about public
affairs.
Conclusion
We cannot respond to the recent fake news crisis by making
fake news illegal or by holding platforms liable for hosting fake
news like the Malaysian government recently did.207 However,
the problem was never in the existence of fake news, a
phenomenon that has always resided in the fringes of the
information ecosystem. The recent crisis was a result of the
current ecosystem’s architecture, which is responsible for the
way information gets amplified and becomes more persuasive.
The assertion put forward in this Article is that we should
regulate certain elements of the underlying architecture, that
we can do so without doctrinal barriers, and that doing so can
address some of the problems that the new ecosystem has made
more salient.
Today’s information environment has changed the
conditions of speech. The new conditions are not aligned with
the prerequisites for citizens in a democratic society to perform
their civic duties, and they undermine the notion of true
autonomous choice in the selection and consumption of content.
It was therefore argued that certain algorithms used by social
media platforms to filter content can and should be regulated.
This argument was primarily structured on a distinction
between algorithms that filter content for hosting purposes
versus algorithms that filter content for navigation purposes.
206. Id. at 54 (stating “political sovereignty embodies democratic selfgovernment, understood as a requirement of ‘government by discussion,’
accompanied by reason-giving in the public domain, where different people
speak with one another and listen respectfully, even when in intense conflict”).
207. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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This distinction can help categorize the growing body of
literature and, most importantly, can describe the limits of the
First Amendment as a deregulatory tool in this context.
Doctrinal barriers preempt regulation of platform content
moderation algorithms, meaning algorithms that implement the
policies of platforms for deciding to host or censor content items.
Algorithms that implement content moderation policies are the
closest to an editorial analogy and, arguably, deserving of full
First Amendment protection.
On the other hand, the challenges are not as strong when it
comes to how platforms facilitate content navigation. This
Article firstly argued that content navigation algorithms should
not be viewed as speech for First Amendment purposes. Further,
it was argued that even if we were to view content navigating
algorithms as speech, this should not be political speech that is
subject to core First Amendment doctrine. Rather, it should be
considered a new category of protected speech that falls outside
the public discourse. Much like commercial speech, it is less
problematic to regulate. Even further, this Article advanced an
argument limited to personalization algorithms in particular,
suggesting that these may not even deserve the limited
protections of the type available to commercial speech, as they
are better categorized as commercial communications that fall
outside the protected speech categories altogether.
Designing a regulatory intervention that can prove effective
is a complex and challenging task that involves future
interdisciplinary work. What this paper demonstrates is that
the First Amendment is not a barrier to taking on such a task.
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